"Only White People can be Racist: What does Power have to do with Prejudice?" by Sawrikar, Pooja & Katz, Ilan Barry
 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.2, No.1, 2010 
ISSN: 1837-5391;  http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs 
CCS Journal is published under the auspices of UTSePress, Sydney, Australia    80 
“Only White People can be Racist”:  
What does Power have to with Prejudice? 
 
Pooja Sawrikar and Ilan Katz 
Social Policy Research Centre, University of New South Wales 
 
Abstract 
Social researchers and activists who use the ‘Racism = Prejudice + Power’ definition, often cited in the 
sociological literature, generally strive for racial equality by highlighting the need to equalise differences in 
social power among racial groups. However, this definition can be taken to extreme when the role of social 
power is given disproportionate weight over the role of prejudice, such as assertions that racism is synonymous 
with White supremacy. While recent debates in the sociological literature do take into account the complex 
relationship between power and prejudice, it is still important to point out the pitfalls of a reductionist approach. 
We argue that the definition ‘Racism = White supremacy’ is logically flawed, demonstrates reverse racism, is 
disempowering for individuals from all racial groups who strive for racial equality, and absolves those who do 
not. We also argue that the recent literature on cultural competency may provide a more enabling discourse 
towards reducing racism. Cultural competency is a move away from ethnocentrism and towards respect and 
value for cultural difference, with no racial group treated as a reference point around which the discourse on race 
relations revolves. We have focused on cultural competency in the delivery of human services in this paper, 
simply as an exemplar for refining the way the term ‘racism’ is used and understood in the current sociological 
literature. Specifically, by properly acknowledging the role of prejudice and not exclusively focusing on power, 
and by de-centring the discourse on race relations from whites, all racial groups can be better empowered to take 
responsibility for protecting the human right to racial equality.   
 
Background and Aims 
Disagreements in the definition of racism have long plagued the research and policy 
discourse on race relations. Such tensions have emerged because researchers, policy makers, 
and activists from different disciplines are interested in different aspects of racism. For 
example, definitions in the sociological literature (e.g. Cazaneve & Maddern 1999; 
Carmichael & Hamilton 1992) tend to focus on differences in social power as explaining the 
nature and scope of racism, as well as the factors that sustain or reinforce its occurrence. 
Definitions in the psychological literature (e.g. Allport 1979) on the other hand tend to focus 
on cognitive processes for explaining the emergence and entrenchment of racism. Legal 
definitions (e.g. United Nations (UN) Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm) are generally interested in how 
institutional practices and policies contribute to or perpetuate racism, and definitions in the 
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economics literature (e.g. Blalock 1967; Sivanandan 1993) stress the role of competition over 
limited resources as a primary reinforcer of racism.  
 
Even within disciplines there may be differences in ideology, such as: 
• The colour blind approach – the belief that culture and race should make no 
difference and people are basically all the same; 
• The equal opportunities approach – believes that structures should be set up to give 
people an equal chance to succeed; 
• The anti-racist approach – believes that ultimately the world is divided into ‘white’ 
and ‘black’ with white = oppressors and black = victims; 
• The diversity approach – belief that there are different cultures and races and that the 
aim is to value each person’s unique attributes; and 
• The Marxist approach – believes that blacks are part of an oppressed underclass and 
the aim is to overthrow the owners of the means of production. 
 
Differentiating the various elements of and approaches to racism is useful because it 
increases precision and accuracy on our understanding of its nature, causes, reinforcers, and 
scope. Indeed, racism is a complex phenomenon and a simplified explanation and description 
would be inconsistent with its nature. Racism is seen in the literature as intimately entwined 
with issues that relate to class, nation, identity, social justice, and institutionalised practices 
(San Juan 2002). However, disagreements in the definition of racism can also lead to 
misunderstanding because researchers, policy makers, and activists do not have a common 
language with which to communicate. This can stifle progress towards reducing racism. And 
as Satzewich (1998) argues, the concept of ‘racism’ is a social phenomenon that is alive and 
well in contemporary society, even though ‘the concept of racism defends us against the 
project of universal belonging’ (Holland 2005) and the concept of ‘race’ has no scientific 
validity (Satzewich 1998).  
 
The aim of this paper is not to take these various elements of racism and propose a unified 
definition that reconciles these differences, but to compare two of the more common 
definitions used especially in the sociological literature – ‘Racism = Prejudice + Power’ and 
‘Racism = White supremacy’. While the latter definition has some utility because of its 
potency to shed light on what reinforces racism in some (mostly white-majority) societies, we 
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argue that this utility is undermined by four main problems. In particular, this definition is 
logically flawed, it demonstrates reverse racism, it is disempowering for individuals from all 
racial groups who strive for racial equality, and it absolves all racial groups for taking 
responsibility for their contribution to racism in society.  
 
Moreover, we aim to show how the power of language can be used to perpetuate or excuse 
racism and bring about outcomes that are not actually desirable. Indeed, we argue that 
researchers, policy makers, and activists are interested in different aspects of racism because 
they have different end goals they aim to attain. Those who aim to overcome structurally 
racist policies and practices are unlikely to use the economic or psychological definition of 
racism, in which competition over limited resources (Blalock 1967; Sivanandan 1993) would 
be used to justify the stigmatisation and devaluing of the ‘out-group’ and a belief in the 
inherent superiority of one’s own ‘in-group’ (Allport 1979). This is because definitions are 
themselves end goals; identifying the factors that cause racism also provide a pathway for 
identifying how to reduce it. We argue that the end goal of the definition ‘Racism = White 
supremacy’ is less about striving to reduce racism, and more about striving to making whites 
aware of the privileges they attain by virtue of their racial group’s strong social power 
(Wildman 1996; Chandra-Shekeran 2008). As such, and in line with the anti-racism approach 
described above, this definition is not wholly counter-productive. However, we see that this 
end goal is achieved at the cost of the four negative consequences mentioned above.  
 
Finding a language that enhances our understanding of racism but at the same time also helps 
us reduce it is by no means an easy task. However, it is still seen as preferable to this 
reductionist definition, which may help us understand racism but not necessarily help us 
reduce it. Importantly, we have focused on this definition of racism because, although it is 
most often used in the United States of America (USA) and not in Australia, lessons learned 
from the consequences of the misuse (and the power) of language are still relevant in the 
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Two definitions of racism commonly used in the sociological literature 
A. Racism = Prejudice + Power 
Definitions of racism used mostly in the sociological literature are generally premised on the 
assertion that racism is the result of two additive components – prejudice and power1
 
. This 
definition was particularly popular during the 1960s to 1980s in the USA (Rattansi 2007) but 
is still used by a number of contemporary theorists. For example, Cazanave and Maddern 
(1999) argue that: 
racism is a highly organised system of “race”-based group privilege [that is, ‘power’2] 
that operates at every level of society and is held together by a sophisticated ideology 
of colour/“race” supremacy [that is, ‘prejudice’3
 
].   
This definition has a number of benefits. Firstly, it goes beyond the individualised cognitive 
process of negative stereotyping that is used more often in the social psychology literature 
(e.g. Allport 1979). In other words, the definition ‘Racism = Prejudice’ is limited in its 
ability to explain and describe the nature, causes, reinforcers, and scope of racism beyond 
individual interactions, and at the societal or systemic level. Secondly, such a definition 
acknowledges that inequities in the distribution of social power do occur between racial 
groups. As such, it can highlight the need for structural agendas or movements against racism 
in organisations and institutions, rather than leaving the struggle against racism solely to 
individuals. Finally, by drawing attention to both personal and group factors, this definition is 
able to show that individuals shape and are shaped by socio-cultural factors (Chandrakumar 
2008). This is important because although racism is a universal phenomenon, it manifests 
differently in different societies and so the ways it must be countered are also highly sensitive 
to the nuances of that contextual environment.   
 
                                                 
1 While there are a number of different types of power – material, economic, political, and social, for example – 
power is defined here as the capacity to exert any form of influence on others (Giddens 1997). In this paper, 
‘power’ and ‘social power’ are used synonymously. 
2 Italics inserted. 
3 Italics inserted. 
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In short, defining racism as the combination of both prejudice and power is beneficial 
because it is not reductionist or simplistic in its approach, it can mobilise both individuals and 
institutions to take responsibility for striving to reduce racism, and it is sensitive to contextual 
factors. Further, the overarching implication of this definition is that to reduce racism, 
individuals must become vigilant of their racial prejudices and strive to create a society in 
which the power of racial groups is equal.  
 
Current debates in the sociological literature provide important explorations of how the 
power of groups are affected by a range of factors (most especially economic ones), and also 
examine the complex relationship between power and prejudice. For example, the extensive 
work of Fraser (2005, 1997) conceptualises the attainment of social justice along three 
dimensions – redistribution (where the inequity is said to be economically-based distributive 
injustice or maldistribution), recognition (where the inequality is seen as culturally-based 
status inequality or misrecognition), and more recently, representation (where the inequality 
is described as political injustice or misrepresentation). When these three dimensions are ‘in 
balance’ across racial groups, justice, or parity of economic, cultural, and political 
participation, is said to be attained. Although Fraser (2005) views ‘the individual as the 
fundamental subject of justice’ her approach to consciousness-raising is along the lines that 
‘the personal is political’.  
 
Contrary to Fraser, Honneth (1996) places less emphasis on structural matters, although he 
does engage somewhat with the impact of distributive economics, and focuses more on 
recognition issues. While Fraser (2005) sees this framework as simplistic monism, his 
counter position importantly draws attention to the psychological component of racism. 
Honneth (1996) claims that the struggle for recognition defines both human self-formation 
and social formation, and permeates all struggles for social justice. As such, justice is 
understood as the “intersubjective satisfaction of moral expectations that arise as individuals 
attempt to establish a positive self-relation via recognition from others” (Yar 2001, p. 297). 
 
Gilroy (2005, 1999) is more historical than Marxist or philosophical in his approach, and 
offers an understanding of racism and multiculturalism within the context of British 
colonialism and its “(melancholic) attachment to global grandeur” (Williams 2005). Gilroy 
has an “antipathy towards nationalism” (Gilroy 1999, p. 184), and argues that overcoming 
racism requires a planetary or cosmopolitan humanism (cited in Robotham 2005); where 
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individuals are asked to overthrow their attachment to (Black) identity and discover “that 
crushingly obvious, almost banal human sameness” that we all share (Gilroy 2000, cited in 
Gregg 2002). 
 
These sociological theorists have different conceptualisations about the nature of racism (and 
as a result, how it could be combated), but have in common an interest and focus on ‘group’ 
factors that bring about racism at the systemic or societal level. Nevertheless, their positions 
are still organised around the role of power in relation to individual factors such as prejudice 
(albeit to greater or lesser extents).  
 
While an examination of economic and other factors that affect the historic and current social 
power of racial groups are important dimensions in any analysis of racism, a fuller 
exploration of these are outside the scope of this paper. Here, we aim to show that dire 
consequences can arise when too much weight is given to the unequal distribution of power 
between racial groups, and insufficient attention is paid to individual responsibility to address 
prejudice. Indeed, past formulations on the nature of racism, namely that racism is essentially 
synonymous with White supremacy, still appear in contemporary literature. 
 
B. Racism = White supremacy 
Although the political activist, Lewis (1995), acknowledges the role of prejudice, he 
essentially reduces racism to differences in power between racial groups. In this way, he 
asserts that: 
 
in terms of the current world system, racism is essentially and primarily synonymous 
with White supremacy … There’s no such thing as reverse racism because there’s no 
such thing as a simple reversal of the power relationships between Whites and Blacks 
… In the current context, only white people can be racist4
 
.  
While there are no known researchers, activists, or policy makers who define racism as 
equivalent to White supremacy (for doing so would be uncomprehensive and mismatched to 
its complex nature), there are a vast number of writers who use a definition of racism that is 
essentially synonymous with White supremacy, in the same way Lewis (1995) does. For 
                                                 
4 Italics inserted. 
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example, the North American sociologist, Feagin (2006), argues that ‘rarely are whites seen 
as the central propagators and agents in a persisting system of racial discrimination’ (p. 5). 
Similarly, Bonilla-Silva (2001, 1996) argues for the importance of a structural theory of 
racism based on racialised social systems in any discourse on racism.  
 
Wellman (1977) was more extreme in his view, arguing that “only ‘white’ people express 
racist sentiments and act in a racist manner”, although this view has since been rejected (cited 
in Miles & Brown 2003). However, somewhat more recently, van Dijk (1991) writes that 
“many white people may no longer believe in white racial supremacy. They may in principle 
even endorse values of social justice. However, massive legal and scholarly evidence  … and 
personal experiences … show that white people and institutions still engage in the many daily 
practices that implement the system of white dominance and seldom challenge its underlying 
beliefs and ideologies”  (p. ix).  
 
The aim of using a definition of racism that is essentially synonymous with White supremacy 
is to highlight the pervasiveness of the inequitable distribution of social power in the US (and 
other white-majority countries like Australia), and the resultant level of oppression that is 
experienced by others. Thus, researchers, policy makers, and activists who use this definition 
aim to demonstrate that if social power were distributed more equally among racial groups, 
and the pervasiveness of White supremacy were then diminished, racism would reduce. 
While it may indeed achieve this end goal, we argue that there are four major problems that 
also arise from using this definition, and which undermine its effectiveness in achieving the 
end goal.  
 
Problem 1: This definition is logically flawed 
A definition of racism that gives disproportionate weight to power over prejudice is based on 
a logical flaw. It begins with the equation ‘Racism = Prejudice + Power’, but uses the 
historic and current inequity in social power in favour of whites to replace power with this 
nominal racial group; that is, ‘Power = whites’. In this way, it falsely deduces from these two 
premises that ‘Racism = Prejudice + whites’, or in the words of Lewis (1995), that ‘only 
white people can be racist’. 
 
The pervasiveness of White supremacy and the oppression it causes others, cannot, and more 
importantly should not, be denied. There are countless extreme and devastating examples of 
Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal, Vol.2, No.1, 2010    87 
White supremacy throughout human history: Nazi Germany against Jews, Blacks and 
immigrants; the Klu Klux Klan; slavery of Africans in America; British colonial rule in India; 
apartheid in South Africa; and the Stolen Generation in Australia.  
 
White supremacy manifests even in more covert forms. To borrow an example from 
immigration policy in Australia, over the 12 years under the Prime Ministership of John 
Howard (1995–2007), the language of ‘assimilation’ was arguably normalised in official 
vernacular. The Department of Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) was changed 
to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), reflecting a move from 
celebration of multiculturalism to citizenship rights and responsibilities conditional on 
integration to and knowledge of ‘Australian values’ (http://www.citizenship.gov.au/); the 
language of ‘tolerance of difference’ rather than ‘acceptance of difference’ was arguably 
routinised; and without a human rights framework in Australia, the rhetoric of ‘social 
inclusion’ rather than ‘social justice’ still implicates that some groups have the power to 
decide who should or needs to be socially included (Jakubowicz 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of white supremacy should not negate inclusion or discussion 
of instances of racism that do not involve whites. For example, racism can occur between two 
or more minority ethnic groups in white-majority countries. Instances of this are 
demonstrated between Asians and Caribbeans in the United Kingdom (UK) during the 2005 
riots (Townsend 2005). Although, as Noivo (1998) argues, the occurrence of inter-minority 
racism is in part due to the racialisation they undergo at the hands of dominant group, he also 
argues that there are other processes that influence how and why minority groups 
discriminate against one another. Racism can also occur between relatively established 
migrant groups and newly arrived migrant groups in Australia (Griffiths, Sawrikar, & Muir 
2008; Satzewich 2002), as well as between migrant groups and Indigenous Australians 
(Griffiths et al 2008). To extend the point, racism can occur between the majority and any 
minority ethnic group in any non-white majority country, such as between Fijians and Indians 
in Fiji (Davies 2007).  Indeed, the extensive work of Okihoro (2001, 1994) embodies 
alternatives to the commonplace binary-based narratives that devalue or exclude the 
experience of Asian peoples in the USA and assume that there are only two races – white and 
black (Newman 2002).  
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Thus, the pervasiveness of white supremacy does not justify replacing the definition of 
racism, and instances of racism that do not include whites should not be excluded from 
discussions and debates on racism. In short, we argue that White supremacy necessarily 
implies racism because it is one (very common and powerfully destructive) example of 
racism, but racism does not necessarily imply White supremacy. These two terms should not 
be used synonymously.  
 
Problem 2: This definition demonstrates reverse racism 
The statement or belief that ‘only White people can be racist’ (Lewis 1995) is itself a 
negative or prejudicial stereotype. While this statement or belief does not assert that every 
white person is racist, it does assert that only white people have the capacity to be racist 
because only white people have power.  This is prejudicial, because it reflects a negative 
generalisation about a racial group (Devine 1989). (Indeed, the term prejudice is derived from 
the Latin prae judicium, meaning ‘pre-judgement’).     
 
Lewis (1995) asserts that ‘there’s no such thing as reverse racism because there’s no such 
thing as a simple reversal of the power relationships between Whites and Blacks’. While it 
may be difficult to overturn entrenched discrepancies in social power in the future, given the 
current and historic inequity in the distribution of social power, it is untrue that racial groups 
other than white have no social power with which to hold whites accountable for their racism. 
Thus, the prejudicial assertion that only white people can be racist is an example of how 
people from minority ethnic groups can misuse the social power their racial group does have, 
albeit currently lower than their white counterparts, and demonstrate reverse racism. In this 
way, it repeats the very mistake it is trying to rectify – devaluing ‘the other’. It justifies the 
use of racism to overcome racism, thereby perpetuating its occurrence. 
 
Problem 3: This definition is disempowering 
The concept of white supremacy uses the current and historic context to fix the social power 
of whites as definitively higher than all other groups. By doing so, the quality of power 
becomes inherent or fixed to ethnicity; white people have more power than other groups 
because of their race. However, since ethnicity cannot be changed, the implication is that 
their higher power also cannot be changed.  
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This is disempowering for all groups that strive to reduce racism. For example, whites who 
are aware of the privileges afforded to them from their current and historic social power may 
nevertheless be trapped by ‘White guilt’ (Steele 2006); they cannot strive to attain their goal 
for reducing racism because they cannot change their ethnicity. Similarly, individuals from 
racial groups other than white also cannot strive to reduce racism because their ethnicity 
precludes them from having the power to affect the discourse on race relations and the way 
power is distributed across racial groups. They too must accept racism as an ‘unchangeable 
fact’ because their ethnicity is unchangeable. To overcome this sense of disempowerment for 
all racial groups, it is important to note that levels of power are not inherent to race; they are 
reactive to circumstance and therefore can change. In other words, the past does not (have to) 
dictate the future. 
 
Problem 4: This definition absolves all racial groups for taking responsibility for racial 
inequality 
Whites who do not strive for racial equality and do believe in the inherent superiority of their 
race can use the ‘fixed’ higher social power to justify their racism. If the definition of racism 
accepts that whites have more power than other groups, then there is an increased risk that 
whites will believe they are more worthy of this higher social power than any other racial 
group. This definition lets whites who do not strive for racial equality ‘off the hook’ for 
taking responsibility for their contribution to racism, because they cannot change their 
ethnicity and the fixed higher power that this ethnicity then implies. Similarly, individuals 
from racial groups other than white are also absolved for taking responsibility for their 
contribution to racism because they can use their current and historic lower social power to 
argue that they are less accountable for the prevalence of racism in society. While it is 
arguable about whether their racial prejudices may have less capacity (or power) to adversely 
affect others, this does not however indicate that these racialised prejudices are not in fact 
demonstrations of racism; it is untrue that ‘only white people can be racist’, as Lewis (1995) 
and others (e.g. Feagin 2006) argue.  The capacity to be racist is a human phenomenon, not a 
racialised one.   
 
Summary 
In short, the definition ‘Racism = White supremacy’ is tendentious, and creates two other 
social problems in addition to the entrenchment of racism in society: it perpetuates its 
occurrence by justifying the use of (reverse) racism to overcome racism, and it makes the task 
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of reducing racism impossible because it is based on the notion that racism is an inherent 
component of racial identity which cannot be changed.  By ignoring the subjective (or 
cognitive and interpretative) aspects of racism, this definition has the perverse effect of 
‘fixing’ racism as an inherent constituent of society rather than something which can be 
changed or combated. Indeed, since the definition ‘Racism = White supremacy’ has 
somewhat gone out fashion during the 1980s, and with the introduction of anti-racism and 
anti-discrimination laws and the implementation of (albeit sometimes tokenistic) policies to 
improve parliamentary representation, overt racism has reduced, demonstrating that over time 
things do and can change.  
 
Extreme examples of institutional racism periodically emerge to remind us of how entrenched 
white supremacy is. For example, the racist murder of Steven Lawrence brought to light the 
systemic racialised inequality and injustice of the UK Metropolitan police force (Sivanandan, 
Sebestyen, & Seabrook, 2000). While such examples are severely costly and support 
Sivanandan’s (2000) assertion that “institutional racism is the litmus test of a society’s 
democracy” (p. 73), there is also a risk that such examples can induce an equally extreme 
swing toward mis-weighting the respective roles of prejudice and power in the occurrence of 
racism. To help bring back the balance after these extreme reminders of the prevalence of 
white supremacy, we need a language that also reminds us that there are indeed (at least) two 
aspects or factors necessary for its occurrence; power alone cannot bring about racism5
 
. 
Where to from here? 
We have shown in the discussion above that definitions do matter.  The challenge is to 
develop a definition of racism which would show empathy for all racial groups who have 
suffered hundreds of years of oppression because of White supremacy; advocate for the needs 
of racial groups with especially low social power6 by taking responsibility for rectifying 
current inequities in social power7
                                                 
5 By analogy, ‘power’ is the length of a matchstick, but ‘prejudice’ is the redhead needed to light the match. 
; instil a sense of awareness among whites for the 
privileges that are afforded by their groups’ strong social power (but as Pedersen (2008) 
points out, doing so by developing empathy for the oppressed which is an enabling or 
6 Or religious groups, especially Muslims. 
7 For example, ‘the Apology’ to Australia’s Stolen Generation and generating strategies to ‘close the gap’ in 
access to health and education opportunities. 
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empowering emotion, rather than inducing feelings of guilt which can be disempowering); 
and look forward into a hopeful future towards reduced racism.  
 
So what could be an effective approach for developing a definition of racism that enables its 
reduction through the more equitable distribution of social power and also continues to 
highlight its subjective aspect, but without perpetuating its occurrence, disempowering 
individuals and groups that strive for racial equality, and absolving those that do not? We 
have turned to the recently emerging literature on cultural competency in the specific area of 
the delivery of human services to assist in answering this question.  
 
While the concept of cultural competency is becoming increasingly acknowledged across a 
range of study fields (e.g. media studies, Downing & Husband 2005), we have drawn here 
upon one specific area with which we are familiar – the delivery of social services. 
Essentially, cultural competency in the delivery of social services is a move away from 
ethno-centric organisational practices and institutional policies, and a move toward respecting 
and valuing cultural difference for the richness this difference can offer to both service users 
and service providers.  
 
Cultural competency in social service delivery is a multifaceted concept, with the literature 
emphasising personal or self reflective, organisational, and/or political components (e.g. 
Korbin 2007; Butt 2006; Gustafson 2005; Webb & Sergison 2003; Weerasinghe & Williams 
2003; Campinha-Bacote 2002; Purnell 2002; Box et al. 2001; Forehand & Kotchick 1996). 
Based on these various characteristics, we have re-conceptualised cultural competency as an 
ongoing process (rather than an attainable state) that usually, but not necessarily, emerges 
from two other interrelated components – cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity. 
 
As we have described elsewhere (Sawrikar 2009; Sawrikar & Katz 2008), we define cultural 
awareness as having knowledge about the norms of other racial groups.  In essence, it 
requires us to have sufficient knowledge about a group to be able to form a stereotype. It is 
important to note that stereotypes are neither inherently positive nor negative; they are simply 
cognitive schemas that help us organise information and allow us to make inferences in 
cognitively efficient ways (Baron & Byrne 2006). They are only said to be prejudicial when 
the beliefs that comprise the stereotype are detrimental to the wellbeing (Vaughan & Hogg 
2005) and/or compromise access to opportunities for individuals in that racial group (Fraser 
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1997). Importantly, by having cultural awareness, a service provider is able to acknowledge 
the impact of culture on the behaviour of their clients from minority ethnic backgrounds. 
 
On the other hand, we define cultural sensitivity as referring to knowledge about how 
individuals within that racial group differ from the ‘norm’ of that group (Sawrikar 2009; 
Sawrikar and Katz 2008). In other words, we are now asked to challenge the stereotype we 
have formed so that it is sensitive to individual variation. The complexity of individuals can 
then be acknowledged, instead of treating them as representatives of their cultural group 
(Noble 2008).   
 
There are a number of personal outcomes for service providers in striving for cultural 
competency. These include (but are not limited to), having a sense of efficacy when 
interacting with and providing social services to people from other cultures (Bell et al. 2005), 
not being fearful to admit a lack of cultural awareness about a particular group (Brophy et al. 
2005), increasing one’s general interest in cultural diversity (Braithwaite 2003), being less 
likely to judge cultural differences as positive or negative, and being more able to accept the 
occurrence of, sometimes irreconcilable (Rossiter 2008), cultural differences. And it is based 
on these personal and beneficial outcomes identified in the cultural competency literature that 
we draw inferences and conclude on the pitfalls of the reductionist definition ‘Racism = 
White supremacy’ at the broader sociological level. 
 
By analogy, we infer that the main outcome of cultural competency at the societal level is 
that one’s own racial group is de-centred as the reference point from which others deviate. In 
culturally competent social service delivery, service providers are asked to explore how their 
own culture impacts their behaviour and values and to be vigilant on how these may be 
contributing to biases in the way they deliver services to their minority ethnic clients with 
different cultural behaviours and values. In doing so, the client group is not seen as deviating 
from some (ethno-centric) standard, but that the (culturally different) space between the 
service provider and service user is an ethnically equitable dyadic unit8
                                                 
8 We are referring here to equity in racialised social power, but acknowledge that professional differences in 
social power will also affect this unit. 
 in which subjective 
and interpretative, but negative, stereotypes can be overturned (by both service users and 
service providers).  
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At the broader level, de-centring the two groups so that they are each understood in relation 
to one another, (and not understood as the minority group in relation to the white group), 
allows for the unique cultural characteristics of each racial group to be acknowledged and 
valued equally. Respect and value for ‘the other’ emerges because each culture is equally 
valued in their own right, and the value of difference is seen an important asset contributing 
to the fabric of socio-cultural life; each has something to teach and learn from ‘the other 
side’. This approach is consistent with the ‘diversity approach’ described earlier.    
 
Importantly, if there is no reference group around which the discourse on racism revolves, 
then it can avoid a number of problems. For example, it avoids inadvertently strengthening 
the power of whites who are seen as the fixed reference point with definitively higher social 
power than all other groups; no racial group dominates the agenda or movement towards 
reduction in racism; instances of racism that do not involve whites are not excluded from 
discussions on racism; each racial group is valued for their unique cultural characteristics; 
and no racial group is held hostage to their unchangeable ethnicity from which inferences 
about social power may be made.  
 
We have drawn here on the service provision sector as an example of how debates in the 
general academic literature on racism may want to form itself in the future; taking direction 
from an area in which ‘the general’ is currently applied (and indeed across several fields of 
application). However, this paper is not about racially equitable service provision or any 
other area of application. It is about the definition of racism, the power of language, and the 
need to avoid discourses that impede the goal of reducing racism. To this end, the concept of 
cultural competency, drawn from the service provision literature, has been used here to show 
a possible way forward from the simplistic and (what we see to be) destructive definition 
‘Racism = White supremacy’.  
 
In short, we are arguing that ‘respect for cultural difference’ is one possibly effective strategy 
for attaining the end goal – reducing racism (or attaining racial equality, to use a part-utopian 
optimism) by equalising social power but without perpetuating its occurrence, 
disempowering groups that strive for racial equality, and absolving those that do not. In the 
words of Honneth (1996), ‘it is a claim for ‘respect’ in the form of ‘rights’’ (cited in Yar, 
2001, p. 300).  
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Our argument is consistent with Taylor’s (1994) advocacy for ‘cultural survival’; national 
policies that demonstrate value for cultural preservation. We see that policies that promote 
cultural preservation enable all citizens (from both the white majority and all minority ethnic 
groups) to choose which aspects of all the diverse parts of their exposure to multiculturalism 
(phenotypic, cultural, and/or linguistic, for example) that they would like personally preserve 
and incorporate into their subjective or “affirmed identity” (Taylor 1989, cited in Weir 2009).  
 
Implementing policies that reflect the opposite of cultural survival, namely nationalistic 
policies of assimilation, ultimately reflect a judgement on which culture (the dominant, 
‘mainstream’ culture) is valued or respected enough to (continue to) preserve. Such political 
forces of tension that require minority groups to forsake parts of their own cultures and adapt 
to some nationalistic set of behaviours and norms arguably provide fertile breeding ground 
for different groups to be pitted against one another in a separatist fight to preserve their 
authentic identity. The framework we have offered is a vision of plurality that does not 
pretend that there is a ‘mainstream’ nor strives to redefine it (at least at this stage), but argues 
for the equal value of ‘non-mainstream’ cultures to daily and national life. [Arguably, 
‘respect for cultural difference’ and the right to be different without inherent judgments about 
the value of this difference can become a tie that unifies a nation (Etzioni 2009) assuming a 
shared national vision is what is desired, although we do not see that striving for a shared set 
of national values is desirable because such a goal will inevitably involve divisive processes].  
 
Importantly, we see that this framework espouses the value of culture itself; and it is the loss 
of culture which is seen as detrimental and in need of protection. But as culture is a dynamic 
process in a constant state of re-interpretation (across situations, time, individuals and 
generations, for example), it is not the specific, identifiable or categorical aspects of culture 
which we are asking to respect and protect. Indeed, we are quick to point out that it is not the 
group differences that essentialise people and cultures that we see as important in preserving, 
as Taylor has been criticised for implying by Fraser (2005) and others (e.g. Crowder, 
Ludeman, & Vas Dev 1997). It is the principle or ideology that culture itself (in however a 
(globalised) citizen chooses to express their numerous cultural parts) is of value, and that 
(multi-)cultural differences between people are a rich source of society’s fabric to be 
acknowledged as essential in preserving. In this way, ‘status equality and not the validation of 
group identity’ (Fraser 2005) is what is protected. 
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Having said this, we do acknowledge that the rhetoric of ‘respect for cultural difference’ 
comes with its own set of complex issues and it is not a simple goal to understand or 
implement. For example, such rhetoric will likely lead to questions such as those posed by 
Cantle (2005) who asserts that “in a multicultural country there must be a clear political will 
to reach a consensus on what level of “difference” is accepted and which differences are 
acceptable” (cited in Burnett 2007, p. 116). That is, the need to empiricise the quantity and 
quality of ‘respect for difference’ among some researchers as the basis for homogenising a 
nation and its citizens through some sort of ‘shared vision’ (a notion also espoused by San 
Juan Jr, 2002) will form part of the challenge in implementing our suggested framework and 
language. However, we still take the position that at the very least, this kind of language is a 
positive step towards reducing racism compared to the perverse and disempowering 
definition ‘Racism = White supremacy’. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, racism is not reducible to White supremacy. As the stereotypes that underlie 
racism are subject to change with new information that either broadens, challenges, or 
disconfirms the previously held prejudicial stereotype, racism is seen, in part, as a choice. 
Indeed, it is crucial to create a space for the language of choice and personal responsibility in 
the discourse on racism because this kind of language is empowering and therefore seen as an 
effective tool for reducing racism. By properly acknowledging the role of ‘prejudice’ in 
racism, and not exclusively focusing on the element of ‘power’, individuals can be better 
empowered to exercise their own personal power and choice to be vigilant on their racial 
prejudices, and all racial groups can be better empowered to take responsibility for protecting 
each of our human right to racial equality. 
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